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This thesis looks at the Mexican War with specific attention to 
the question of whether the war was Southern inspired, In order to 
examine this matter several methodological approaches have been em-
ployed. First, this study reviews the·pre-existing historical inter-
pretations of the war for the purpose of determining how the 
"slavocracy conspiracy" thesis began and why, despite articulate 
refutations, it lingers. Second, Congressional voting on the questions 
relating to the Mexican War ·such as the annexation of Texas, the 
declaration of war with Mexico, the Wilmot Proviso, the treaty which 
ended the war·, and finally, the Compromise of 1850, have been examined 
to determine sectional and partisan voting patterns. Third, key 
figures from the various sections have been examined in ol'de·r to ob-
tain a fuller understanding of the complexities which characterized 
the Mexican War ·and the sectional balance in the period 1845-1850. 
The soul'ce material used for this study included primarily 
government documents, especially the Congressional Globe, numerous 
biographies and other secondary sources dealing with the Mexican War. 
I would like to thank several members of the History.Department 
for their assistance and guidance: Dr. Odie B, Faulk, my·'advisor, 
whose patience and advice made this exercise truly fruitfill; Dr. John 
Sylvester, whose suggestions added new dimensions to this study, and 
lastly, Dr. Homer Knight, head of the department, whose encouragement 
was always welcome. 
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In addition, I would like to thank the staff of the Oklahoma 
State Library for their prompt and willing help in the researching 
of this thesis. 
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THE MEXICAN WAR: MYTH AND REALITY 
The House Chamber was filled as the clerk read the message of 
President James K. Polk. Congress was meeting in joint session to 
hear a presidential call for war with Mexico. The hush was broken 
only by an occasional cough and by the voice of the clerk reading 
President Polk's words: "We ·are called upon by every consideration of 
duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, 
and the interests of our ·country."1 Following the·reading of the 
request, the·congregation of Senators and Representatives returned to 
their respective chambers to consider what the Pre·sident had askedf 
The next day, May 12, 1846, Congress had concurred with the President 
and gave him his declaration of war. 
Thus the war with Mexico officially began, a war which has been 
oversimplifi,ed and, consequently, misunderstood. ·For man;yt, the only 
needed explanation for the war's existence has been sU1llI!led up in a 
single word--sectionalism. Some historians have dismissed it as 
a Southern war, created by and sustained for the sole benefit of that 
sectien. Such generalizations, while ·perhaps convenient, do not 
entirely do justice to the facts. An analysis of Congressional roll-
. call vote·s proves that the Mexican War was more the promoter of 
1senate Document 337, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Serial 476, P• 5. 
1 
2 
sectional discord than the product of sectional interest, 
The Mexican War still today is viewed slightly askance by most 
persons. To many the nzyth that it was a Southern war is reality, 
How did this nzyth begin and why doe·s it persist? A brief examination 
of the historiography of the war will give some clues, Immediately 
following the war, histories of the conflagration appeared which 
viewed it patriotically--as a fine national achievement. One such 
work, written by H. Judge Moore, tried to show in part that a citizen, 
or volunteer, arnzy could successfully wage an offensive war, 2 John 
s. Jenkins' book was favorable to the Democrats and President Polk. 
Jenkins believed, unlike many later historians, that territorial ex-
pansion was not a war aim.3 Although not persuaded that a Southern 
conspiracy caused the war, Charles T. Porter in his work criticized 
·~ ¢': ..... ~ ..... . ' . 
American greed, both Northern :and Southern, as a cause of the' ~r, 
thereby foreshadowing a change in historical interpretation, 4 
If the first histories had been biased in favor of America's 
having fought Mexico, those which appeared for the remainder of the 
century were equally biased against America's having been invoived, 
Simply stated, many historians who wrote about the war during this 
period viewed the conflict as a slavocracy conspiracy perpetrated upon 
a duped nation. The classic treatment of the conspiracy thesis 
appeared in 1849--William Jay's ! Review of the Causes and Consequences 
2H. Judge Moore, Scott's Campaign in Mexico (Charleston, s. c.: 
J. B. Nixon, 1849). 
3John s. Jenkins, History of the War between the United States 
and Mexico (Auburn, N.Y.: Derby, Miller & Co., 1849), 
4 Charles T. Porter., Review of the Mexican War (Auburn, N.Y,: 
Alden & Parsons, 1849). 
3 
g,! ~ Mexican l'f!r.. 5 In it he said that the war was unnecessary and 
that the only reason it was fought was to gain additional slave terri-
tory for the South. His account reveals his strong Whig abolitionist 
tendencies and his disdain for President Polk and the Democrats. 
Abiel Livermore in his work basically agreed with Jay's slavocracy 
thesis, but added that the United States was becoming a world power 
and felt the need of proving itself. 6 As late as 1904 this same 
thesis was being espoused. James Ford Rhodes, in his work Which 
appeared that year, commented that "Mexico was actually goaded into 
the war. The principle .of the :manifest destiny of this country was 
invoked as a reason for the attempt to add to our territory at the 
expense of Mexico." 7 
The slavocracy interpretation remained in force for over fifty 
years. However, in the first part of the twentieth·centilry histerians 
began to see a need for new interpretations of the war, a need for a 
compromise between the two extremes which had characterized previous 
accounts. .As early as 1892, the shifting viewpoint was in evidence. 
Cadmus M. Wilcox in his book challenged the conspiracy thesis. 8 The 
book, a standard military work on the war, brought forth the thesis 
that America was justified in fighting Mexico and that it was Mexico's 
5William Jay, ! Review 2f. the Causes and Consequences 2f. the, 
Mexican War (Philadelphia: U, Hunt & Co., 1849). --
6Abiel A. Livermore, The War with Mexico Reviewed (Boston: 
American Peace Society, 1850). 
7 James Ford Rhodes, History tl the United States from~ Compro-
mise of 1850 (7 vols.; New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1904). 
8cadmus M. Wilcex, .Histery of the Mexican !l!,t (Washington, 
D. C.: Church News Publishing Co., 1892). 
demagoguery which lecl to war. George P. Garrison likewise saw no 
evidence of a conspiracy in his book Westward Extension, 1841-1850,9 
American claims against Mexico, United States aid to Texas, the 
annexation of Texas, and the violation of Mexican territory by the 
United States were four areas of dispute which Garrison thought had 
led to the war. He furthermore believed that the war had wide 
national support. Continuing in the anti..;conspiracy school, George 
L. Rives in his two-volume work was less kind to the .Americans.10 
Rives revealed a basic sympathy for the Mexicans and Latin culture 
in general, concluding that the United States could have been more 
patient with Mexico. Farnham Bishop tried to steer a middle course 
4 
between patriotism and criticism, while clearly refuting the slavocracy 
11 theory. 
In 1919 Justin Smith ~ote in two volumes what has been 
ever since considered the definitive work on the Mexican War, A 
s,omewhat patriotic account, The War With Mexico emphasized the in-
evitability of the conflict. 12 Smith believed the de:tl¥agoguery of 
" Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna and the Mexican government in general to 
have been one of the main factors leading to war. Smith also felt 
that .American claims were just and that they alone were sufficient 
9George P. Garrison, Westward Extension, 1841•1850 (New York and 
London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1906). 
10George L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848 (New 
York: C, Schribner's Sons, 1913). 
11Farnham Bishop, ~ First War with Mexico (New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1916). 
12Justin Smith, The War With Mexico (2 vols.; New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1919). 
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reason to go to war. He, like many of his fellow historians, believed 
the annexation of Texas to be the single most important event leading 
to war. 
Following Justin Smith, several influential books and articles 
appeared. Charles s. Boucher's "In Re that Aggressive Slavocracy'' was 
probably the most articulate refutation of the conspiracy thesis.13 
He pointed out that the most influential slaveholders opposed the war. 
Eugene I. McCormac in his book showed great admiration fer President 
Polk.~4 He believed that Polk wanted only what was best for the 
country. Although McCormac felt that Polk possibly was unwise in 
moving troops to the Rio Grande, he believed that Mexico used this as 
an excuse for war. Emphasizing the "vacuum theory," Edward Channing 
in his monumental work of six volumes stated that although the United 
States had no moral right to expand into Mexican territory, it was the 
country's destiny to do so. 15 
Edward Channing's expansionist thesis has since been shared by. 
numerous historians. Clayton C. Khol, in his book, viewed the claims 
t . 1 f A- • • • 16 L" k . ques ion as mere y an excuse or .tl,[uerican expansionism. i ewise, 
Jessie s. Reeves believec:f: the war· to be-,a product of il1'llerican expansion-
l3Charles s. Boucher, "In Re that Aggressive Slavocracy" Missis-
sippi Valley Historical Review, VIII (June-September, 1921), 13-79. 
14Eugene I. McCormac, Jam.9cS !· Polk: ! Political Biography 
(Berkeley, Calif.~ University of California Press, 1922). 
l5Edward Channing, ! History of the United States (6 vols., New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1905-1925). 
16c1ayton c. Kohl, Claims ~ !. Cause of the Mexican !t.!£. (New 
Yerk: The Facultyr of the Graduate School of New York University, 
1914). 
ism. 17 Reeves further stated that the United States would have gone 
to war with Mexico even if Mexican soldiers had not crossed the Rio 
Grande and attacked .American troops. A desire to "regenerate" the 
Mexican people and fulfill .America's Manifest Destiny was the thesis 
of Albert K. Wineberg's Manifest Destiny. 18 
The pre-World War II years remained ones in which historians 
continued to emphasize expansionism as the prime reason for war with 
Mexico. In the only monograph on the subject, John Fuller's~ 
Movement fQ.r. the Acquisition !2f. !!1.Mexicg pointed out that the move-
ment to acquire the whole of Mexico had, contrary to popular belief, 
much support in the North and met with surprising resistance in the 
South.19 Other historians who following World War II reiterated the 
expansionism thesis included Allan Nevins, Charles G. Sellers,· Otis 
Singletary, and Frederick Merk. 20 
6 
However, not all later-day historians have centered their argument 
on the territorial expansionism theory. One notable alteration of the 
thesis was undertaken by Norman Graebner whose Empire .Q.!1. ~ Pacific 
l 7 Jessie S. Reeves, .American Diplomacy under y;1er fil!!! Polk 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1907 - . 
18Albert K. Wineberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press; 1936)_ · 
l9John Fuller, ~Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1947). · 
20.Allan Nevins, Ordeal of Union (New York: c. Scribner's Sons, 
1947); Charles G. Sellers, Jr., James!,. ~' Jacksonian, 1795-1843 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Otis Singletary, 
~Mexican War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Fred-
erick Merk, Manifest Destin:y and Mission in .American History (New York: 
Knopf, 1963). 
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21 stressed economic expansionism as the true cause of the war. The 
United States wanted California, San Francisco harbor to be exact, for 
the purpose of carrying on trade with the Orient, said Graebner. The 
current interest in statistical analysis has led to several studies 
ef the Mexican War. Foremost among these is Joel Silbey's Shrine of 
Party which examines sectionalism and politics in relation to the 
M . w. 22 exican ar. 
As is readily evident, there have been :myriad interpretations of 
the Mexican War. The slavocracy theory has long been refuted. Yet 
the :myth lingers. Why do so many persist in labeling it a Southern 
war? The answer may be found, in part, with the age in which it 
existed. Most persons commonly defined events which happened in 
nineteenth-century .America in terms ef the Civil War. Thus the 
Mexican War neatly can be seen through the prism of that conflict, 
giving the viewer a distorted but comfortable vision. In reality, 
the war was much more complex, a fact which many write~s have failed 
te fully grasp. It was a war involving people and passions, parties 
and ideelogies, a nation and its sections. 
21 Norman Graebner, Empire .Q!! the Pacific (New York: Ronald Press 
Ce., 1955). 
22Joel Silbey, The Shrine of Party (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh 
University Press, 1967). For a more extensive examination of what 
histerians have written about the Mexican War see Peter T. Harstad 
and Richard W. Resh, "The Causes of the Mexican War--A Note on 
Changing Interpretations," Arizona and the West, VI (Winter, 1964), 
289-302. 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS AND 
THE DECLARATION OF WAR 
The first Congressional vote both to create problems with Mexico 
and at the same time provide Congress with a sectional issue was the 
annexation of Texas. The Mexican government had ominously warned that 
the annexation of the Republic of Texas by.the United States would be 
considered a hostile act. Yet despite this warning, the Lone Star 
Republic was added to the Union in 184.5 •. In·the fall of 1843, 
President John Tyler's administration had begun negotiations With the 
administration of Sam Houston, completing a treaty ot annexati"on on 
April 12, 1844. However, the treaty failed ta receive the required 
two-thirds majority needed for ratification in the United States 
Senate, owing its rejection in large part to the activities ef 
Northern abolitionists. 
The "reannexation of Texas" and the "reoccupation· of Oregan" 
were major paints in Democratic· candidate James K,, Palk' s platform 
in the campaign ef 1844. Polk wen the election, an indication· ta him 
of the nation's desire to see Texas become part of the Union•· 
President Taylor likewise was convinced, and prior to leavingeffice 
introduced a joint resolution of annexation requiring only a simple 
majority of both houses of Congress. After long debate, Congress 
passed the measure, and the President signed it on March 1, 184.5. In 
8 
his first inaugural address President Polk oongratulated Congress for 
its action, noting that 
The republic of Texas had made known her desire to come 
into our Union, to form a part of our confederacy, and 
to enjoy with us the blessing of liberty secured and 
guaranteed by our constitution. Texas was once a part of 
our country--was unwisely ceded away to a foreign po'Wer--
is now independent, and possesses an undoubted right to 
dispose of a part or the whole of her territory, and to 
merge her sovereignty as a separate and independent State, 
in ours. I congratulate my country that~ by an act of the 
last Congress of the United States, the assent of this 
government has been given to the reunion.I 
The cause for celebration felt by many doubtless was teinpere'd by 
Mexico's iillillediate response. Mexico for its part lived up to its 
9 
threat and broke diplomatic relations with the United States five days 
after the joint resolution of annexation was signed. 
In addition to the threat ef war with Mexice other factors 
entered into the debate on the annexation of Texas. Of these 
additional issues, it was the questien of slavery which·proved to be 
the crux of the argument. If breught into the Union, the Lone Star 
State {,,ould bring with it a vast amount of terri tory--slave te·rri tery. 
Many Northerners were reselutely apposed ta the addition a·f any mere 
slave states. The debate, therefore, assumed sectienal'characteristics. 
Many states, both Nerth and South, passed their own reselut~ons giving 
opinions en the advisability of annexing Texas. As weuld be expected, 
many Northern states were against annexation, while nearly every 
Seuthern state expressed its .opinien in faver of such a move;, ··The 
Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution against annexation which 
1as quoted in John s. Jenkins, James !•· Palk and !. History of 
His Administration (New Orleans: Burnett & Bostwick, 1854), P• 155. 
10 
complained of the method of annexation, and decried the spread of 
slavery that weuld result from adding Texas to the Union., ·rn: a 
passionate conclusion the resolution declared that Massachusetts "will 
never, by arry act or deed, give her censent to the further extension 
>Gf slavery to any portion of the werld.." 2 Ohio had similar complaints 
and remarked. in its resolution that its citizens opposed. annexation 
because it would "further extend the undue advantage which the citizens 
of the slave-holding States have over those of the States in Which 
slavery is not permitted."3 However net all of the states of the Old 
Northwest opposed annexation. Michigan voiced its approval. · 
As could be expected most e:f the positive responses cam:e from the 
Seuth. The legislature of Leuisiana in its reselution stated.that 
"it is the deliberate opinion that a majerity e:f the people .of Louisi-
ana are in :favor of the immediate annexatien of Texas to the· United 
States· by arry la'W'.ful or constitutienal m.eans.," 4 Alabama likewise 
urged annexation. Hewever, sectional unity on this matter was net 
abselute. The General Assembly ef New Hampshire passed a reselution 
in favor ~f adding Texas to the Union. Sounding remarkably like these 
of its Southern neighbors, the resolution declared: 
That we regard it as an insult to the people of Texas, 
who have gallantly achieved their liberties by the sward 
of revolutien, to make the consent of Mexico a prerequisi~e , 
to their reannexation to the United States; and that an 
attempt te precure the assent of Mexico, now cenvulsed. 'With 
insurrection and. torn with contending :factions, each 
claiming te wield the rightful powers of government, weuld 
be as fruitless as unnecessary and uncalled for by the 
2 Senate Document 141, 28th Cong., 2nd sass., Serial 457, p. 11., 
3senate Document 55, 28th Cong., 2nd sess.,, Serial 464, p. 2., 
4senate Document 90, 28th Cong., 2nd. sess., Serial 465, P• 1. 
j' 
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justice and law of the case.5 
On January 25, 1845, the House of Representatives passed the joint 
resolution of annexation by a vote of 120 to 98. 6 As the va~ious 
resolutions passed by the states foreshadowed, the debate in the House 
was bitter. On January 11, Representative J. P. Kennedy of Maryland 
raised doubts about the method by which annexation would be under-
taken, and described the joint resolution then being considered as 
"contertion, conflict, almost agony of mind, to contrive a way (for 
·annexation to take plac;J ". 7 Chastising those behind such a move, 
Kennedy warned that "the spectre of a violated constitution tracks 
their footsteps, and many are afraid to look behind.118 On the other 
side of the question A. P. Stone of Ohio on the day preceding the 
vote had remarked that Texas must inevitably join the Union because 
"our republic is to be an ocean-bound republic. Providence intended 
this western hemisphere to be an asylum for the eppressed, and that 
our institutions should be their guardians."9 Such was the moralistic 
tenor of many remarks both pro and con. 
However·, the vote in the House revealed that the more pragmatic 
concerns of party pelitics were also of great importance. The 
Democrats under Polk had been elected on an expansionist platform, 
5senate Document 337, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 450, p. 1. 
6congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., XIV, 194. Regional 
de.finitions am the make-up of the House of Representatives, 28th 
Congress, can be found in appendixes A and B. 
7Agpendix to the Congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2nd sesso, 
XIV, 29 • 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid., p. 227. 
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TABLE I 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEX.AS--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Democrat Whi~ ' Democrat Whi~ 
Northeast 7 9 15 
Middle Atlantic 22 17 23 
Nerthwest 24 4 13 
Border 16 4 1 9 
South 42 5 7 
TOTAL 111 9 31 67 
and some Whigs were not particularly eager te help the Democrats 
fulfill their·campaign promises. Thus, the vote reflected a cembina-
. ,~-.. ... 
tion of sectional and partisan intersts. Only nine Whigs voted for 
the-measure while there was a considerable amount of Northern Demo-
cratio opposition. 
Party cohesion in the Senate on the issue of annexation was even 
greater than in the House. However, like the debate in the House, the 
oratory which filled the Senate Chamber had a decidedly moral toneo 
Senater Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, uring the passage of the 
resolution and refuting the charges of those op:posing it, bellowed: 
What! seizing upon the lands of an unoffending neighbor 
[TexaiJ, because it is weak, when this resolutien merely 
expresses our assent to that neighbor coming into the 
Union, and co-operating with us in the great business 
of self-government; and when, under this constitutien, 
which had been in existence fifty years, without stain 
er reproach, we had never seized upon a foot of land 
belonging to any neighbor, or any remote government. 10 
In the same vein, Senator W. T. Colquitt of Georgia urged that his 
fellow Senators "bid them (Texani) welcome, as brethren, to share 
with us a common heritage; and by passing the ·resolution on your 
table, paint another star on our flag, under the wings of that proud 
bird which is the emblem of our nation's glery.1111 On February 27, 
the Senate narrowly approved the resolution by a vote of 27 te 25. 12 
For some, sectional loyalties were secondary to other concerns as is 
13 
evidenced by five Southerners voting against annexation. Furthermore, 
in both houses of C<mgress there were Northern Senators and Repre-
sentatives who voted for ·annexation, some of whom feared an increased 
British influence in North·.America if Texas remained an independent 
country. 
10.Append.ix to the Congressional Globe,, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., 
XIV, 233. 
11Ibid., p. 256. 
·12congressional Globe, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., XIV, 3~2. The 
composition af "t,he Senate, 28th Congress, can be :f.'eund in .Appendix B. 
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TABLE II 
THE ANNEXATION OF TEX.AS--SENATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Democrat Whie: De:mecrat Whi'1'. 
Northeast 4 8 
Midtlle Atlantic 3 1 4 
Northwest 5 3 
Border 2 1 5 
South 9 2 1 4 
TOTAL 23 4 1 24 
The next major vote in 'Congress was triggered by events in 
Texas. On April 24, 1846, Mexican troops crossed the Rio Grande, 
attacked an .American patrol, and killed or weunded sixteen Americans. 
In the text of his war message Polk revealed that General Zachary 
Taylor had been sent with his troops to the Rio Grande "to protect 
private property, arrl to respect personal rights.1113 However, Polk 
said that Taylor had been directed not to commit arry aggressive acts 
against Mexico or its citizens. Again, according to the message, 
Polk revealed that General Pedro de Ampudia had, on April 12, ordered 
Taylor to withdraw his troops north of the Nueces River and that 
"in event of his failure to comply with these demands, announced that 
l3senate Document 337, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Serial 476, p. 4. 
15 
14 arms, and arms alone, must decide the question." However., it was 
not until the twenty-fourth that .Ampudia made goad his threat. For 
Taylor ·and his troops on the Rio Grande the war had begun. 
Prior to Polk's receipt of the news that hostilities had 
commenced, he had been agonizing over the state of relations with 
Me:x:ico and whether or not to ask Congress for ·a declaration of war. 
In his diary entry of May 9, Polk revealed that he had put the question 
of war with Mexico to a vote of his cabinet and that only the Secretary 
of the Navy had opposed such action. 15 According to the diary, the 
Cabinet adjourned about two o'clock in the afternoon; later the same 
day Polk received ward that Taylor's troops had been attacked. The 
Cabinet was recalled that evening to consider the new devel0pments, 
and this time all consented to asking Congress for a declaration of 
16 war. 
With the news of the attack, Polk was assured Congressional 
support. The ne:x:t day the clerk read the message Polk had written. 
The words were strong and forceful. They were words that ap1'>6aled to 
the emotional--the national honor had been impugned. Polk had written, 
"the Me:x:ican government ••• after a long-continued series of menaces, 
have at last invaded our territory, and shed the blood of our fellow-
citizens on our own seil."17 In his conclusion Polk stated: 
14Ibid. 
1~ilo M. Quaife, The Diary of James !· 
Presidency, 1845 to 1849 (4 vols.; Chicago: 
1910), I, 384. 
16Ibid., p. 386. 
Polk During His 
A. C. McClurg & Co., 
17senate Document 337, 29th C0ng., 1st sess., Serial 476, p. 2. 
the most energetic and prompt measures, and the immed-
appearance in arms of a large and overpowering force, 
are recommended to Congress as the most certain and 
efficient means of bringing the existing collision 
with Mexico to a speedy and successful termination.IS 
The House of Representatives quickly began debate on the issue. 
16 
Representative Jacob Brinkerhoff of Ohio urged a prompt and extensive 
response to the Mexican attack. He stated that he wa.s "in favor of 
prosecuting this war in such a manner that our enemy shall be at 
once crushed--such a war as should fully, instantly, at once bring 
them to our feet, and compel the conclusion of an honorable peace--
a permanent peace.1119 Garrett Davis of Kentucky was less enthusiastic. 
He commented that "I require only to know that our army is in danger, 
and whether it be in the territory of the United States or Mexico; 
I am ready to vote men and money even to the utmost resources of the 
country for the rescue." He went on to state however, "I protest 
solemnly against defiling this measure with the unfounded statement 
that Mexico began this war." Davis proceeded, in blunt fashion, to 
lay the blame for the wa.r elsewhere, saying, "if the bill contained 
any recitation upon that point in truth and justice, it should be 
that this wa.r wa.s begun by the President." He did not share Polk's 
belief that the attack had occurred on .American soil. "The river 
Nueces is the true western boundary of Texas. The country between 
that stream and the Del Norte is part of Mexico." Davis saw no need 
for .American troops to have been in the area and accused Polk of 
plotting the wa.r at the expense of innocent parties helplessly 
18Tuid., p. 6. 
l9Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 792. 
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'Despite the opposition of Davis (who abstained from the vote on 
the declaration of war) and a few others, the Reuse passed the 
declaration on the ·same day as it was delivered by the overwhelming 
margin of 174 to 14. 21 Some, like Davis, abstained while others 
voted in favor of the declaration because they wanted t0 provide 
supplies for Taylor's troops, but not necessarily because they wanted 
a war with Mexico. Thus, some support was qualified by meral cleubts. 
The enly opposition to the declaration of war came from a small 
group of Whig abolitionists who viewed the war as a slavecraey 
conspiracy. Most Northern Whigs voted for the declaration fearing 
17 
possible pelitical consequences if they did not. However 9 the majority 
of Representatives were motivated by nationalisti@ concern and be-
lieved at the time that war was imperative. 
20Ibid., p. 794. Interestingly, Mexico in 1845-1846 had never 
made such a claim to the Nueces River; they claimed the Sabine 
River as the boundary. 
21congressional Globe, 29th Ceng., 1st sess., XV, 795. The 
composition of the House of Re:Jilresentatives, 29th Congress, can be 
found in AJ!>Pendix B. 
TABLE III 
DECLARATION OF W.AR--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Native Dem.a-
·crat Whig .American er-at Whig 
Northeast 8 7 7 
Middle Atlantic 27 17 3 2 
Northwest 28 5 5 
Border ·17 12 
South 43 7 
TOTAL 123 48 3 14 
The debate in the Senate was considerably mere lengthy. John c. 
Calhoun of South Carolina early in the debate raised the crucial 
J::>Oint of whether Congress should declare war. He remarked that 
the President had announced that there is war; but 
according to. my interpretation, there is no war 
according to the sense of eur Constitution. I 
distinguish between hostilities and war, and God 
forbid that, acting under the Constitution, we 
should ever confound one with the other. There may 
be invasion without war. But it is .fil!r. sacred duty 
to make war, and it is for ~ to determine whether 
war shall be declared or notG If we have declared war, 
a state of war exists, and not till thenG22 
Calhoun went on to urge a closer examination of the facts. Then 
Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri declared his belief that the message 
18 
concerned twe matters, one of which was diplomatic, the other military. 
19 
The message, at his request, was divided and sent t0 the appropriate 
committees--Foreign Relations and Military Affairs. 23 For this reason 
the issue could not be resolved in one day. 
The next day the debate continued. Reacting to several proposals 
that the .American response 0nly be a defensive one, Senator Lewis Cass 
0f Michigan retorted, "A Mexican army is upon our soiL Are we to 
confine our efforts t0 repelling them? Are we to drive them to the 
border, and them sfop our pursuit?" He added that "the advantage 
would be altogether on the side of the Mexicans, "While the loss would 
be altogether ours~ ••• No vote of mine shall place rr\}7 country in 
this situation.1124 John M. Berrien of Georgia, however~ continued 
the line of reasoning brought forth by Calhoun the day before. "A 
declaration of war is not necessary for the purpose of arming us with 
all necessary power to repel the invasion, and punish the aggression." 
Berrien furthermore added that "if recognized by the Government of 
Mexico, then war exists; if not, the hostility wi.11 have been committed 
by an officer of the Mexican army~ and no war -will exist between the 
two countries.1125 Joining the two hesitant Southerne,rs 9 John Davis 
of Massachusetts stated that 9 
:l.f it turns out tJ:.1.at this territory tbetween the Nueces 
and the Rio Grand~ is debatable ground, a serious 
responsibility rests somewhere, and presents the 
question of war in a very cl.ifferent aspect from what 
it would have possessed hacl. the invasion been m~ge 
within the acknowledged lirrdts ef this country. 
23Ibid. 
24Ibid., p. 799. 
25Ibido, p. 801. 
26lb"d 
J. • ' p. 786. 
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Yet despite the reluctance of some of these Senators, the 
declaration of war was passed by a vote of 40 to 2 on May 12; 1846."27 
TABLE IV 
DECLARATION OF W.AR-~SENATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demecrat Whig Democrat 
Northeast 3 2 1 
Middle Atlantic 3 2 1 
Northwest 5 2 
Border 3 4 
South 12 4 
TOTAL 26 14 2 
The two dissenting votes were cast by Whigs: Thomas Clayton of 
Delaware and John Davis of Massachusetts. John c. Calhounj a Demo-
crat, plus George Evans of Maine and John Berrien of Georgia, both 
Whigs, were present but did not vote. Again, there were those who 
did not wish to oppose supplying Taylor's troops with provisions~ but 
who also did not want to see such action lead to a full scale war 
with Mexico. Thus, Calhoun, Evans, and Berrien did not give active 
27Ibid., p. 804e The com:position of the Senate 7 29th Congress, 
can be found in Appendix B. 
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suppert to the declaration, choosing sile~ce as a reflection of 
their reservations about the developing conflict. It is interesting 
that two respected Southern Senators did not actively support the 
measure. If this was a Southern war, it certainly lacked total 
Southern support, 
CHAPTER III 
THE WILMOT PROVISO AND . 
THE BERRIEN RESOLUTION 
The news of the declaration of war was received at first 
enthusiastically in the United States. .Americans, both North and 
South, rushed to volunteer for military service. Citizens meeting 
in Detroit, Michigan, affirmed their loyalty to the cause, saying, 
"that Michigan will cheerfully respond to the call of the general 
government, and furnish her quota of men and means, and hold herself 
1 in readiness to defend the honor·and soil of our common country." 
A public demonstration outside city hall in New York City was 
attended by 50,000 people calling for vigorous measures in prosecuting 
the war. 2 The war·also attracted the interest of various religious 
groups. Some members of the Catholic Church in .America regarded the 
war as a possible means of adding large numbers of Catholic Mexicans 
to their fold, while several Protestant sects eyed Mexico as fertile 
ground for the conversion of deluded papists.3 
However, as the war progressed it became increasingly more 
1senate Document 395,: 29th Cong. 1st sess., Serial 477, p. 4. 
2Justin Smith, The War with Mexico (New York: MacmQ!lan CCompany1, ---- ....- ,,...__..__ 
1919), II, 268. 
3clayton s. Ellsworth, ".American Churches and the Mexican War," 
.American Historical Review, XLV (January, 1940), pp. 301-26. 
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unpopular. Whigs, hoping to recapture the White House and increase 
their party's ·power, soon labeled the conflict "Jimmy Polk's War;" 
Northern "Conscience" Whigs attempted to cast doubt on America's moral 
justification for fighting Mexico. And not all religious groups 
supported the war; the Quakers were actively involved in anti-war 
activities. Nor was all the dissatisfaction located in the North; 
Calhoun became a bitter opponent of the war. Should the United States 
win the war and thereby gain Mexican territory, the possibility existed 
that such alien territory would threaten the South's prominent posi-
tion in national politics. Furthermore, Calhoun feared increased 
sectional and class conflicts should any Mexican territory be added 
to the Union. 
Calhoun's fear that the Mexican War woulcl lead to aaditional 
sectional antagonisms was well, founded. The war posed one basic 
problem. If Mexican territory was addecl to the Unitea States, would 
it be free or would it be slave, arrl who wauld decide such an impor-
tant issue? Most Americans wantea Californiaj and many wanted yet 
more--if not all--of Mexico. But the question of slavery complicated 
the matter. It is not surprising then, that long before the war was 
concluded, some Congressmen would propose plans to resolve the thorny 
problem. 
When the Pennsylvanian:rose to prepose his solution, Congress 
was busied with the chores of concluding the first sessian of the 
Twenty-ninth Congresso What this man suggested, this Davis Wilmot 
of the Keystone state, was that the territory the Unitecl States would 
gain as a result of the war with its southern neighbor be made 
permanently free by an act of Congress. It was in August, 1846, that 
I 
i 
Wilmot introduced an amendment to the "Two Million Bill," a general 
appropriations measure. The amendment read, 
Provided, That, as an express and fundamental condition 
to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic 
of Mexico by the United States, by virtue of any treaty 
which may be negotiated between them, and to the use by the 
Executive of the money herein appropriated, neither 
·slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any 
part of said territory, except for·crime where0f the }:'>arty 
shall first be duly convicted.4 
This amendment, surely one of the more famous in .American hist0ry, 
quickly became known as the Wilmot Proviso. Despite the Southern 
24 
Representatives' strenuous objections, the Proviso was added to the 
appropriations bill by a vote of 83 to 64.5 The bill itself likewise 
was passed and sent to the Senate for c0nsideration. However, the 
bill reached that chamber·0nly an hour 'before the time set for 
adjournment of the session, and as a result it died in the Senate. 6 
Wilmot remained persistent. In February of the next year he 
reintroduced the Previs0 as an amendment to the "Three Million Bill," 
a replacement for the never•passed "Two Million Bill." As could be 
expected, the debate in the House was long and passionate. Jacob 
Brinkerhoff of Ohio declared that "there is no danger of the dissolu-
tion of the Union; but if • • • the arms and the blood of this Nation 
shall be used to propagate slavery over free soil--why, let dissolu-
tion comet"? Bradford R. Wood of New York delivered a lengthy speech 
4 Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 1st sessa; XV, 1217. 
5Ibid., p. 1218. 
6Charles B. Going, David Wilmot, Free Seiler (New York: D. 
Appleton and Company, 1924), p. 101. 
?congressional Globe, 29th Conge, 2nd sess., XVI, 377a 
on the Proviso. A Democrat, Wood accepted the growing Northern Whig 
interpretation of the war--that it was Southern in~pired. 
The South ebtained the whole of Texas. • • .She now 
claims whatever of Mexico shall be acquired by this 
war. After clutching the whole of Texas and involving 
us in war she now talks of the fairness of dividing 
these Mexican conquests. She shoU.ld have thought of 
this before. It is too late now. Come what may, so 
far as I am concerned, slavery shall go no further; and 
the threat that you will dissolve the Union unless 
permitted te extend slavery over these newly acquired 
territories, and wgere it does not now exist, is as 
empty as the wind. 
Wood did not share the belief of some of his colleagues that 
slavery would not be profitable and therefore would not exist in 
territories gained from Mexico because of a hostile environment. He 
pointed out that, "slavery exists even in the colds of Russia. It 
will go wherever.man in his cupidity of lust and power can carry it, 
and remain just as long as it is possible.119 Joshua Giddings of 
2.5 
Ohio likewise accepted the view ef the South's culpability with regard 
to the war and the spread of slavery. However, he wanted to attack 
the problem at its source--the actual annexation of any war-gained 
territory. Giddings declared, "I greatly fear, sir, if we add to 
the extent of our southwestern border it will prove an extension of 
slavery." He went on to comment that 
J88. 
I am ••• opposed to obtaining any mere territory in 
that directi6n or iii ·any other., I would confine Texas 
to the precise limits occupied by her at the time of 
annexation. Beyond that I would not extend the power 
of the slaveholder to recapture his slave. I would 
leave the whole country beyond the valley of the Nueces 
free. Let it be a place of refuge, unpolluted by the 
footsteps of the slave~catcher; where the panting 
8Appetrlix to the Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., XVI, 
fugitive may rest in safety; where no Texan master shall 
have f>OWer to seize or reenslave him as .he may now do in 
our free States.IO 
To a Southerner those were fighting words, and his response was 
measured in kind. 
Southerners resorted to their particular interpretation of the 
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Constitution ta attack the legality ancl. morality of the Willl'l0t Proviso. 
Thomas H. Bayly of Virginia used just such a line of reasoning when he 
spoke to the subject. He pointed out that "the Constitution guaranties 
[si~ to each State a republican form of government, the fundamental 
principle of which is the right of self-government." He added that 
"the very definition of tyranny is to be subject to laws in the en-
actment and continuance of which we have no voice; the very definition 
of republicanism is the right te gevern ourselveso" Continuing his 
remarks about the Constitutien and the Missouri Compromise Bayly 
concluded: 
This proposition to exclude. slavery from all the 
territories hereafter acquired without any reference 
to its geograf>hical position evinces bad faith upon 
the part of the non-slaveholding States. It is not 
only a palpable violation of the Constitution but also 
of the Misseuri compromise.11 
The vote on the Wilmot Proviso came on February 15, 1847, and 
the amendment was approved by a vote of 115 to 106.12 The vote was 
overwhelmingly sectional as could be expected, for it was a sectional 
issue. As such it elicited a sectional response. 
lOibid., p. 456. 
11Ibid., p. 391. 
12Congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., XVI, 425. 
TABLE V 
THE WILMOT PROVISO--SECOND HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Deme- Native De:m.e-
c:rat Wb.ie: American crat Whiir 
Northeast 10 20 
Middle Atlantic 31 23 3 5 1 
Nerthwest 17 11 11 
Border 18 13 
South 48 10 
TOTAL 58 54 - 82 24 3 
Within the Senate there were these who wished to avert what 
seemed to be an impending crisis. Senator John Berrien of Georgia 
propesed. an amendment of his own ta the "Three Million Bill". The 
amendment stated: 
Provided, always, And it is hereby declared. to be the 
true intent and meaning af Congress in making this 
appropriation, that the war with Mexico ought not te 
be pr0secuted by this Government with any view to the 
dismemberment 0f that republic, or to the acquisi ti0n by 
canquest of any p0rtian of her territory; that this 
Government ever desires to maintain and preserve peaceful 
and friendly relations with all nations, and l'larticularly 
with the neighboring republic of Mexico, will always be 
ready to enter into negotiatians, with a view to terminate 
the present unhappy conflict on terms which shall secure 
the just rights and preserve inviolate the national honer 
of the United States and Mexico; serve those amicable 
relations which ought always to exist between neighboring 
republics, that the boundary af the State of Texas should 
be definitely settled, aril. that prevision be made by the 
republic of Mexico for the prompt and equitable settlement 
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of the just claims of our citizens on that republic, 13 
Voicing the concern of Calhoun, Berrien warned that "the acquisition 
of territory must bring before us, •• a question which now menaces 
the permanence of this Union." 14 Senator James T. Morehead of 
·Kentucky agreed and asked, "Have we not land enough to satisfy any 
American citizen? Or is there such a pressing necessity to have 
more that we will endanger all that is dear to us in the pursuit of 
this policy?"l.5 However, the pleas of these and other Senators were 
in vain; (m::>st .Americans did not want to renounce expansionism com-
pletely) the amendment failed and the Senate was faced either with 
accepting or rejecting the proviso of David Wilmot. 
President Pe,lk did not remain completely aloof from the pro-
28 
ceedings. He wrote in his diary on January 4, 1847, that "the slavery 
questian is assuming a fearful & I110st important aspect." He added 
that it "will be attended with terrible consequences ta the country, 
and cannot fail to destrey the Democratic party, if it does not 
· ultimately threaten the Union its elf." 16 As for the Wilmot Proviso . 
and the method by which its passage was being attempted, Polk com-
mented: 
It is a domestic and not a foreign question, and to 
connect it with the appropriations for prosecuting 
the war, or with the two million appr-opriation with 
a view to obtain peace, can result in mg ~goqd, 1but -
must divide the country by a sectional line & lead to 
the worst consequences •••• I deplore this state of 
lJibid.' p. 326. 
14Ibid., p. 330. 
l.5Ibid., p. 34.5. 
16Quaife, The Diar;v ,g! James K· .E21!'s, II, 30.5. 
things; I will do all I can to correct it; I will do 
my duty and leave the rest to God and my oountry.17 
Clearly Polk did not approve of the Proviso--neither of the spirit 
which metivated it nor the means by which it was to be accomplished. 
The Senate undertook lengthy debate on the Proviso and the 
"Three Million Bill" which reflected the same moralistic tone that 
had been evident in the House. The degree to which presidential 
29 
pressure influenced the outcome of the vote is difficult to estimate. 
However, the Senate did finally reject the Proviso by a margin of 
31 to 21 on March 1, 1847.18 Like that of the Housej the vote in 
the Senate was non-partisan--but sectional. The Northeastern 
Senators voted unanimously for, while Southern Senators voted 
unanimously against, the Proviso. Senators from the Northwest and 
Border states gave most of their votes to the opposition and thereby 
assured defeat ef the amendment. 
17Ibid., p. 306. 
18congressional Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., XVI. 555. 
TABLE VI 
THE WILMOT PROVISO--S~ATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Democrat Whill Democrat Whiiz 
Nertheast 4 8 
Middle Atlantic 3 3 1 
. Northwest 1 3 
Border 1 1 4 5 
South 13 5 
TOTAL 8 13 21 10 
David Wilmot ma4e one last attempt to add the Proviso to the 
"Three Million Bill" When the House 0f Representatives reconsidered 
it. This time the House narrowly rejected the amendment by a vote 
of 97 in favor to 102 opposed on March 3, 1847.19 As had been the 
30 
case in the Senate, the crucial votes came from the Representatives 
from the Middle Atlantic and Northwestern states. In the second vote 
the Middle Atlantic states doubled their opposing votes (from six to 
twelve) with the state of Pennsylvania providing the largest number 
of negative votes. 




TEE WILMOT PROVISO--THIRD HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Native Demo-
crat Whii:1' .American crat Whie-
Northeast 9 20 
Middle Atlantic 25 19 1 12 
Northwest 13 10 10 
Border 18 11 
South 42 9 
TOTAL 47 49 1 82 20 
The Wilmot Proviso provided an issue for the mid-term election 
of 1846. In that election the Whigs gained control of the House, 
scoring significant victories in the Middle Atlantic and Northwest 
regionso Northern sentiment favored the Proviso, and some Northern 
Democrats who had opposed the Proviso found themselves victims of 
the Whig anti-slavery onslaught. 
The Wilmot Proviso had been rejected. It would be reintroduced 
from time to time, but would not gain Congressional approval until 
the South had withdrawn from the Union. Although the amendment had 
failed, it had not done so by large margins, however. The dialogue 
which developed as a result of the measure was heated and often far 
from healthy. Yes, the Proviso had been defeated, but not until it 
had polarized Congress and stirred deep and abiding resentment in 
the S0uth. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TREATY OF GUAD.ALuPE-HIDALGO 
AND THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 
The war did finally end. Nicolas Trist, the Chief Clerk of the 
State Department, had been sent with General Winfield Scott's aril\Y to 
be on hand to negotiate a peace settlement with the Mexican govern-
ment. Trist's performance had not pleased the President, however, 
and in October of 1847 the State Department had sent a note recalling 
him. Trist had ignored the note and continued negotiations without 
authorization, which had shocked and infuriated Polk. On February 
2, 1848, in the Mexico City suburb of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, Trist had 
signed a treaty of peace with Mexico and forwarded it to Washington. 
The treaty called for Mexican recognition of the Rio Grande as the 
southern boundary of Texas and for a vast cession of land which 
included California, New Mexico, and points in between, for which 
the United States agreed to pay Mexico the sum of $15,000,000. The 
United States, on the other hand, agreed to pay all .American claims 
against Mexico, · whichi ~vientually .'8.illounted to ·more than .three· 
million dollars. Also the treaty included a provision for the es-
tablishment of a separate commission to survey the boundary between 
the two countries. 
President Polk noted in his diary on February 19, 1848, that 
he had received the treaty and also commented, "Mr. Trist has acted 
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very badly. • • , but notwithstanding this, if'· en further examination 
the Treaty is one that can be accepted, it should net be rejected en 
account of' his bad conduct.111 Polk, very much the pragmatist, did 
submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification although it had been 
negotiated without official American sanction. The Senate dutifully 
ratified the treaty on March 10, 1848, by a vote ef 38 in favor te 14 
against. 2 The vote was basically non-sectional and non-partisan, 
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although a larger percentage of Whigs than Democrats voted against the 
treaty. Justin Smith, the war's chief historian, sarcastically :pGinted 
out: 
• ,.,;··: ·<1;.. .,. .... : •• ~ -
The inefficient and shameless wa.r·was new brilli~nt and.most 
creditable. Indeed, the Whigs chose fer ·a. standard-bearer 
a man {]a.chary Taylor] who represented prof essiona.lly the 
military spirit they had raised pieus hands against, who 
belonged to the slaveholding order so plainiy viewed askance 
by the New Commandment, who had recommerrl.ed the. advance 
te the Rio Grande, who had aimed the ca.nnen at Mata.mores, whe 
had advised appropriating Mexican territory by force of' arms, 
and who owed in fa.ct all his prominence to playing a lea.ding 
role in the 'illegal, unrighteous, and damnable' war.3 
Clearly most Northern Senators were not unhappy with the treaty. On 
the other hand, four Southern Senaters (two Democrats and two Whigs), 
fearing the addition of alien territory, voted against the treaty. 
If' the Mexican War had been a slavocra.cy conspiracy, it had been a 
curious one indeed! 
1Quaife, ~ Diary of' James !~ fQJJf, III, 345. 
2senate Eicecutive Docume~t 52, 30th Cong., 1st sass., Serial 509, 
p. 36. The coI11p>0sition of the Senate, 30th Congress, can be found in 
Append.ix B. 
3Smith, ~War with Mexico, II, 268. 
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TABLE VIII 
THE TREATY OF GUAD.ALuPE-HIDALGO 
YES NO 
Demacrat Whis::!' De:m.ecrat WhiQ'. 
Northeast 4 4 3 
Middle Atlantic 4 2 1 
Nerthwest 4 3 1 
Border 1 4 2 
Sau th 13 2 2 , 2 
TOTAL 26 'i2 7 7 
The years which i?rimediately fellewea·the Treaty 0f Guadalupe-
Hidalg0 were trying 0nes. By 1850, the nati0n was threatened with 
disunion. Some of the treubles had been cause~ by the Mexican War; 
ethers had net. In 1849, California, NewMexice, and Utah (Deseret) 
applied fer stateh00d. The question ef slavery in these areas loomed 
large; Northerners wanted it prehibited there while Southerners wanted 
it permitted. To further complicate matters, Texas had attempted to 
erganize New Mexico County (the part ef present~day New Mexico east 
of the Rio Grande) enly to be spurned by New Mexicans, as well as 
Presidents Zachary Tayler and Millard Fil:mere. The problem reached 
such grave proportiens that Texas, unwilling te give up a large part 
of its territery 'Without some sert of compensatien, threatenea ta 
organize the area by force if necessary. In additien, the North 
wanted the slave trade.abolished in the.District of Celunibia, while 
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the South wanted a strong fugitive slave law. Neither section favored 
the other's proposal. 
Congress was badly divided, and talk of secession was not rare. 
Into this impasse stepped Henry Clay, returned to the Senate for his 
last great effort. Clay proposed a series of compromises. California 
would be admitted as a free state as it had requested. Texas would not 
exercise jurisdiction over eastern New Mexico but would be compensated 
for its loss (Texas eventually was paid $10,000,000). New Mexico and 
Utah would be made territories, and they would choose (according to 
the doctrine of popular sovereignty), upon admittance to the Union, 
whether they wished to be slave or free. A fugitive slave law would 
be enacted and the marketing of slaves in the District of Columbia 
would be forbidden. The bill was originally reported out of committee 
in the form of one bill--a fact which made passage impossible. The 
Om:i.nbus Bill, as it was called in its unitary form, was debated end-
lessly. It wa.s, in fact, the subject of some of the greatest oratory 
in .American history. Senator Thomas Hart Benton objected to the 
Compromise because of the manner in which California was to be admitted. 
He remarked: 
California is a State, and has a right to be treated as 
other States have been, when asking admission into the 
Union, and none of which have been subjected to the 
indignity of having their application coupled with the 
decision of other, inferior, and, to them, foreign 
questions. 
I object to it upon principle--that principle of 
fair legislation which requires every measure to stand 
or fall upon its own merits, unaided by stronger measures, 
unimpeded by weaker ones.4 
Concluding his speech, Benton urged the Senate to consider carefully 
4congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st sess., XXI, Part I, 656. 
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the Compromise measures and to remember the framework in which all 
such matters should be considered. In the spirit of calmness, he noted: 
The Constitution is the compromise. It is the binding 
compromise, ani has been faithfully kept by every Congress 
from 1789 to 1850; a.nd there is not reason to suppose it 
will not continue to be kept. If it shall not be kept, 
it will be time enough, after the breach is committed, 
to think of the remedy--the remedy of disunion. We 
sheuld no more look ahead for the causes of disunien, 
than we should look ahead for the causes of separation 
from our wives, or for the murder of our mothers.5 
Henry Clay rose to make his reply to Senator Benton's criticisms. 
The modest Clay, clearly disturbed by the divisiveness the bill had 
generated, stated: 
There is bad and good mixed together. You may vote 
against it if you please in toto, because of the bad 
there is in it, or you may vote for it, because you 
approve of the greater amount .of good there is in it. 
The question for the time is, whether there is more of the 
good than of the bad in the bill; and if the good outweighs 
the bad, that will be g further consideration for voting 
for the whole measure. · 
Senator Calhoun made a proposition of his own. In essence the vener-
able Southern Senator wanted.Congress to guarantee the rights of the 
South and to provide a sectional equilibrium between the two sections. 
He, for one, believed the nation headed for disunion, and remarked: 
It is a great mistake to suppose that disunion can be 
effected by a single blow. The cords which bind these 
States together in one common Union are far too numerous 
for that. Disunion must be the work of time. It is only 
through a long process, and successively; that the cords 
can be snapped, until the whole fabric falls assunder. 
Already the agitation of the slavery question has snapped 
some of the most important, and has greatly weakened all 
the others.7 
5Ibid., p. 657. 
6Ibid., P• 661. 
7Ibid., p. 453. 
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Perhaps prophetically, Calhoun warned that the South's interests must 
be protected. He believed much of the so~called Compromise of 1850 to 
be injurious to the South. Therefore he opposed the measure in its 
lump sum. 
There were others similarly disenchanted by the compromise Clay 
offered. One·especially influential antagonist was Senater William 
~. Seward. A young Northern radical, Seward believed the Compromise 
too 'lenient on the :matter of slavery. His "Higher Law'' speech earned 
for him a place of recognition in the annals of great .American oratory. 
In his speech Seward bellowed: 
I AM OPPOSED TO ANY SUCH COMPROMISE, IN ANY AND ALL 
THE FORMS IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED, because, while 
admitting the purity and the patriotism ef all from whom 
it is my misfortune to differ, I think all legislative 
compromises radically wrong and essentially vicious. They 
invelve the surrender of the exercise 'ef judgment and 
conscience en distinct and separate questions, at dis-
tinct and separate times, with the indispsnsible advantages 
it affords for ascertaining the truth. They involve a 
relinquishlll.ent of the right,to recensider in future the 
decisions of the present,·on questions prematurely antici ... 
pated; and they are a usurpation as ta future questions 
of the province of future legislators.8 
Seward attacked the argument Seutherners had put f erward that the 
Censtitution protected their rights as slave-holders. He expressed 
his belief that there was a higher law than the Constitution, saying 
It is true, indeed, that the national domain is ours; 
it is true, it was acquired by the valor and with the 
wealth of the whale nation; but we hold, nevertheless, 
no arbitrary power over it. We hold no arbitrary autherity 
over al\Y' thing, whether acquired lawfully, or seized by 
usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardships; 
the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, 
to welfare, and to liberty. 
But there is a higher law than the Constitution, 
8A'ppendix te the Congressional Globe, 31st Ceng., 1st. sess, 
XXII, Part I, 262. 
which regulates our authority over the domain, and 
devotes it to the same noble purposes.9 
Because of this higher law, Seward could not justify voting for 
popular sovereignty or for the fugitive slave law because they were 
designed to perpetuate the barbaric institution of slavery. 
As eloquent and as moving as many of the speeches had been, it 
was the speech of Daniel Webster of Massachusetts which proved to be 
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classic. Resolutely opposed to slavery, Webster nonetheless supported 
the Compromise. The logic he stated in his "Seventh of March Speec~' 
was convincing, and his oratory was persuasive. When Texas entered 
the Union, he said it had retained the right to divide itself into as 
many as five states--presumably slave. Webster declared that he would 
support Texas in any such move since it originally had been given 
permission by Congress to separate into additional states and that he 
would ''not violate the faith of the Government.1110 
But what of the territories they were legislating for now? Should 
slavery be forbidden? Webster's answer was surprising. He declared: 
As to California and New Mexico, I hold slavery to be 
excluded from those territories by a law even superior 
to that which admits and sanctions it in Texas--I mean 
the law of nature--of physical geography--the law of the 
formation of the earth. • • • California and New Mexico 
are Asiatic in their formation and scenery. They are 
composed of vast ridges of mountains, of enormous height, 
with sometimes broken ridges and deep valleys. There 
may be in California ••• , some tracts of valuable land. 
But it is not so in New Mexico.11 
Although Webster's geography may have been faulty, the grain of truth 
9Ibid., p. 265. 
10congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st sess., XXI, Part I, 480~ 
11Ibid. 
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was there. California, New Mexico, and the rest of the Mexican Cession 
largely were unsuitable for the Southern cotton culture. 
Despite various urgings for acceptance of the Omnibus bill, 
passage could not be obtained. President Zachary Taylor, who relied 
on William H. Seward for much of his advice, was oppesed to the bill. 
When, in July of 1850, Congress finally began to vote on the Compro-
mise, it immediately was choked by numerous amendments by Senators 
who disliked one provision or another. Clay left Washington on August 
2, wearied from the months of debate and battling, and in poor health. 
It was during his absence that victory for his compromise was 
obtained. The various measures incorporated in the bill were separated, 
thus allowing Congressmen to consider the merits of each without having 
to come to some decision based on the relative worth of the proposals 
in the aggregate sum. Another event also helped assure acceptance. 
President Taylor had died on July 9, and his successor, Millard 
Filmore, was in favor of compromise, u~.J.ike his predecessor who had 
been opposed to it. 
The first of the proposals to be considered was the bill to 
adjust the Texas boundary between that state and New Mexico and to 
pay Texas for its loss •. The vote was taken on August 9, with 30 
voting in favor and 20 against. 12 The vote was basically non-partisan 
and non-sectional. Although Texans generally approved of the measure 
(both Texas Senators voted in favor of the bill), they were unable to 
convince some of their Southern colleagues who believed that Texas 
was giving away too much territory. Some Northern opposition came 
12Ibid., XXI, Part II, 1555. The composition of the Senate, 
31st Congress, can be found in Appendix B. 
TABLE IX 
TEX.AS BOUNDARY BILL--SENATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Demo- Free 
crat Whi'1' crat Whi2' Soil 
Northeast 2 6 2 1 
Middle Atlantic 2 3 1 
Northwest 7 3 1 
Barder 2 3 1 
South 5 3 7 1 
TOTAL i6 14 13 5 2 
fram those Senators who disliked paying Texas $10,000,000 for the 
territory. 
The vote in the House of Representatives on the Texas boundary 
question came on September 6. There it was decided affirmatively by 
the narrow vote of 108 to 97.13 As in the Senate the House vote was 
non-partisan and non-sectional. The only exception to this pattern 
was that the Free Soil Party voted unanimously against the bill in 
the House as well as in the Senate. 
l3Ibid., p. 1764. The composition of the House, 31st Congress, 
can be found in Appendix B. 
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TABLE X 
TEXAS BOUNDARY VOTE--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Demo- Free 
crat Whi!i! crat Whi!i! Soil 
Northeast 5 6 6 8 2 
Middle Atlantic 9 19 2.5 2 
Northwest 17 1 11 8 5 
Border 17 12 1 
South 10 12 27 2 
TOTAL 58 5o 45 43 9 
On August 13, the Senate voted on the bill to admit Calif0rnia 
as a state. This particular bill was heavily debated. Northerners 
wanted the entrance of California as a free state, a provision which 
was included in the bill. Southerners, of course, wanted to gain a 
foothold in the West. The vote was favorable to the admission as a 
free state by the margin of 34 to 18 ani strongly reflected sectional 
positions on the matter of slavery.14 
14Ibid., p. 1573. 
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TABLE XI 
THE CALIFORNIA BILL--SENATE VOTE 
YES No 
Demo- Free Demc>-
crat Whie: Soil crat Whi!i!' 
Northeast 3 7 1 
Middle Atlantic 2 5 
Nerthwest 11 1 
Border 1 2 2 1 
South 1 12 3 
TOTAL 18 14 -2 14 4 
The House voted on the California Bill en September 7, passing 
it by the overwhelming margin of 150 to 56.15 Like the Senate vote, 
the House vote on California reflected the same sectional bias, and 
in roughly the same'proportion. 
15 Ibid., P• 1772. 
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TABLE XII 
THE CALIFORNIA BILL--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Free Demo-
crat Whf.g Soil crat Whi11 
Northeast 13 9 2 
Middle Atlantic 10 45 2 
Northwest 28 9 6 
Border 11 12 8 
South 3 38 10 
TOTAL 62 78 10 4b 10 
The third of the compromise measures to be considered by the 
Senate was the bill to make New Mexico a territory with the right of 
popular sovereignty. The vote, taken on August 15, was 27 to 10 in 
favor. 16 It was primarily sectional, but not as rigidly as was the 
vote on the Wilmot Proviso. Opposition to the measure came from 
Representatives in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, and Northwest 
regions who detested th~ conc'ept, of popular sovereiinty. 
Southerners, both Whig and Democrat, voted unanimously for the bill. 
16Ibid., p. 1589. The vote in the House of Representatives to 





THE NEW MEXICO BILL....SENATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Demo- Free 
crat Whie: crat Whie: Sail 
Northeast 2 2 4 
Middle Atlantic 2 2 1 
Northwest 7 2 1 
Border 2 1 
South 7 4 
TOTAL 20 7 4 5 1 
The next matter to be considered by the Senate was the Fugitive 
Slave Law. The concern over this bill was sectional--th~ South wanted 
it and the North opposed i t--arid 'the vote of August 2'.3 !·¥·{.ffth · 27 to· 12 
in favor, revealed a strong, but not absolute sectional bias.17 
17Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 31st Cong., 1st. sess., 
XXII, fart lI, i630. 
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TABLE XIV 
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW-..SENATE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo- Demo- Free 
crat Whiiz crat Whill Soil. 
Northeast 1 6 
Middle Atlantic 1 2 2 
Northwest 2 2 1 
Border 2 3 
South 13 4 
TOTAL 18 9 3 8 1 
The House vote on the Fugitive Slave law came en September 12 and 
was 109 to 75 in favor. 18 There the vote was much less sectional than 
in the Senate. In fact, six New Englanders voted for the measure 
while one Southerner voted against it. Despite the fact'that the 
compromise measures originated in the Senate, the spirit of compromise 
and of union was stronger in the House of Representatives. 




THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Demo .. Demo Free 
crat Whill crat Whill Soil 
Northeast .5 1 3 9 4 
Middle Atlantic 8 1 32 2 
Northwest 14 2 13 6 6 
Border 17 11 
South 36 13 
West 1 1 
TOTAL 8i 2s 17 47 12 
Another matter which excited sectional interest was that of 
prohibiting the slave trade in the District of Columbia. This time 
it was the North who favored the bill and the South that opposed it. 
On September 16, the Senate voted on the Slave Trade bill, approving 
the measure by a margin of 33to19.19 
19 Ibid., P• 1830. 
TABLE XVI 
SLAVE TRADE BILL-.SENATE VOTE 
"YES NO 
Demo- Free .Demo-
crat Whi~ Soil crat Whi~ 
Northeast 2 5 1 
Middle Atlantic 2 5 
Northwest 11 1 
Border 1 2 2 2 
South 1 10 5 
West l 1 
TOTAL i8 i2 - - -3 12 7 
The House veted on the Slave Trade bill on September 17, giving 
its consent by the wide margin of 124 to 59.20 Like the vete in the 
Senate, the House tally showed sectional divisions. 
ZOibi"d., 1837 P• • 
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TABLE XVII ' 
SLAVE TRADE BILL--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
Delll€>- Free Demo-
crat Whi~ Soil cra.t Wb.il'1' 
Nerthea.st 11 12 1 
Middle Atlantic 10 43 2 
Northwest 29 8 3 
Border 1 1 13 7 
South 1 1 30 9 
West 1 
TOTAL 53 b5 43 16 
Finally, there was one additional vote c0nnected with the 
Compromise of 1850. On September 7 the Hause passed the bill estab-
lishing the Territory of Utah. Like the bill to organize New Me;>d.co~ 
the Utah measure contained a provision for pepular sovereignty. It 
was approved by the margin of 97 to 85. 21 




THE UT.AH BILL--HOUSE VOTE 
YES NO 
De ma- Demo- Free 
crat Whie- crat Whig Seil 
Northeast 5 2 4 .9 4 
Middle Atlantic 10 10 .' 28 2' 
Northwest 15 10 8 .5 
Border 15 11 
South 17 12 15 
62 - - 45" -TOTAL 3.5 29 11 
Unlike the vote in the Senate on the New Mexico bill, the House vote 
on the Utah question was basically non-partisan and non-sectional, 
although, as in the Senate, all Southerners voted for the measure. 
Thus Congress had enacted the compromises of Henry Clay. 
Temporarily they provided the cement to hold together a crumbling 
nation. The votes showed that sectional considerations were still 
very present if somewhat restrained. On the ma.tter of popU.lar sover-
eignty there were those who voted in favor of measures embodying the 
principle in the interest of union. On the other hand, there also 
were .those who morally could not justify a vote for popular sovereignty, 
be it a Northerner who saw it as a sanction for slavery, or a 
Southerner who saw it as a betrayal of his cause. Similar concerns 
guided the votes on the Sl~ve Trade at:rl Fugitive Slave bills. A 
William Seward could declare that compromise was folly, while a Henry 
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Clay could urge compromise at all costs. For the remainder of 
Senators and Representatives, it was necessary for them to probe their 
individual consciences to find the answer to the question of which was 
the more important--Union or their personal principles. In 1850, a 
majority of congressmen decided in favor of Union. 
CHAPI'ER V 
PERSONALITIES AND CONCLUSION 
The complexities which characterized the Mexican War were best 
revealed in the thoughts and actions of the people who lived through 
the conflict, especially those persons in the government who had a 
direct or indirect say as to how the war should be prosecuted. As has 
been shown, the war created hostilities not only between the. United 
States and the Republic of Mexico, but also between North and South 
within the United States. Doves ani hawks, slaveholders and abolition-
ists found expression through the Mexican War. Each had specific 
desire as to the outcome of the conflict and to the blueprint for the 
future which the conclusion of the war would make necessary. President 
James K. Polk, Senators Thomas Hart Benton, Henry Clay, William Seward, 
John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Lewis Cass, plus Representative 
David Wilmot--these were the men who directed the course of the nation 
during the troubled times of the war and the years which immediately 
followed the peace treaty. They came from every section of the 
country. Some were very representative of their section's desires, 
while others, moved by other considerations, were less often in accord 
with their provincial brethren. Some, like Benton, Clay, Calhoun, 
and Webster, were statesmen of the old school. Others, like Seward 
and Wilmot, were young firebrands who would live through the holocaust 
of the Civil War. Wars are created by men, fought by men, and ended 
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by men. The solution to the enigma which was the Mexican War can, 
theref0re, in part be found with the protagonists--the men of action. 
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The oldest of ten children, James Knox Polk was born on November 
2, 1795, in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The young Polk, 
influenced mainly by his mother, was a rather serious lad and str0ngly 
religious. In 1806 he moved to Tennessee with his family where he 
was educated. However, for his higher education he returned to the 
University of North Carolina where he enrolled'in the sophomore class 
in 1815. After graduation Polk studied in the law office of Felix 
Grundy in Tennessee. Several years later he ran for the state 
legislature, won, and served for two years. In 1824, he married Sarah 
Childress, and in 1825 was elected to the House of Representatives as 
an ardent Jacksonian. 
Polk rose in political stature and power during the administration 
of Andrew Jackson. He was elected Speaker of the House in 1835, and 
from 1839 to 1841 he served as governor of Tennessee. He ran for 
reelection in 1841 and 1843, but was defeated both times. Then in 
1844, with Jackson's blessings, Polk was nominated on the ninth ballot 
as the Democratic candidate for President, largely because of his 
stand in favor of territorial expansion. He ran on a platform calling 
for the "reoccupation of Oregon" and the "reannexation of Texas." 
Polk, of course, won the election, and in doing so became the youngest 
President to serve to that time. As President he asked for and 
obtained, Congressional permission to terminate the joint occupation 
of Oregon with Great Britain. In 1846 he presented the Senate with 
a treaty calling for the present boundaries between the United States 
and Canada, which the Senate dutifully ratified. War had been avoided 
with Great Britain. Neither side had gained all of th~ Oregon Terri-
to:ry it desired; each had compromised. However, compromise was 
unobtainable with Mexico. 1 
There were many points of dispute between the United States and 
Mexico. There was Texas, the fact that it had been annexed by the 
United States and that it claimed its boundary to be the Rio Grande. 
There was California--the United States was interested in acquiring 
access to the Pacific, especially the excellent harbor at San Fran-
cisco. And finally, there was the claims question. Numerous 
pronunciamientos, or revolutions, had caused much damage to .American 
property, and the .American government had continually sought redress. 
Mexico, during the administration of Andrew Jackson, had agreed to 
binding arbitration, but had walked out after only one-third of the 
claims had been settled. The pronunciarnientos which had created the 
claims had also created a situation in Which the normal functioning 
of government, especially with regard to foreign relations, was made 
virtually impossible. The accepted avenues of negotiation between 
the United States and Mexico, for all practical purposes, did not 
exist, and by the choice of Mexico, not the United States. 
However, Polk was not dissuaded from trying. The President sent 
John Slidell to negotiate all points of dispute between the two 
countries. He was instructed to attempt to purchase California, 
ideally by exchanging this territory for the unsettled claims. Mexi~ 
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can officials refused even to receive Slidell 9 claiming their national 
1For additional biographical informatiop·see Eugene McCormad 9 
James !,. ~' ! Political Biography (New York: Russell and Russell, 
1965). 
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honor had been insulted by the suggestion that they sell California. 
Polk has been often criticized for the Slidell mission and his attempt 
to bu;y California, both by his contemporaries and later by historians. 
In all fairness to Polk, it should be noted that the United States 
had paid France for Louisiana and Spain for Florida, and neither France 
or Spain played the part of the insulted party. And five years after 
the war, Mexico cheerfully accepted ten million dollars for a piece 
of nearly worthless territory later called by historians the Gadsden 
Purchase. Why was not their national honor impuned then? It is 
quite simple. A nation's honor generally is insulted only when the 
"offended" party wishes it so. 
And what of the Texas boundary question? Who was right--Texas 
and the United.States, or the Republic of Mexico? At best the terri-
tory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande was disputed ground; 
neither side had complete 1co.ntro1. Texans claimed. the area, but 
Mexico had never recognized that state's independence even though 
much of the rest of the world, including most of Europe, had. When 
General Antonio L~pez de Santa Anna, leader of the Mexican forces 
during the Texas Revolution, had been captured, he had agreed to · 
the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas in the Treaties of 
Velasco. Mexico never ratified the treaties; however, after the 
United States had annexed Texas, and as a result of British pressure, 
Mexico agreed to recognize the independence of Texas 'With the Rio 
Grande as the boundary of Texas. As with their "impugned'• .national 
honor, Mexicans claimed the Sabine River as the boundary, and used 
this claim as an issue when they thought' it .convenient. Polk had every 
right to send troops into the area. The fact that Mexicans attacked 
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them was again a matter of their choice. 
It finally should be noted that by nineteenth-century standards 
the United States had every right to go to war with Mexico over the 
claims question alone. France had declared war on Mexico in 1838 
because Mexico refused to pay French claims. Polk did not want war 
with Mexico as some have charged; however, he was not afraid to fight. 
He wanted negotiations, but after that approach failed~ believed that 
war to be the only way to settle the serious dis~utes between the two 
countries. He has been much maligned about this war. But the all-of-
Mexico movement, which gained momentum during the war 9 was most popular 
in the North rather than the South. 2 And the treaty which ended the 
conflict had strong support in the North. Very few people at that 
time complained of adding the territories gained by fighting. Polk 
was far from a perfect President--his attacks on Generals Zachary Taylor 
and Winfield Scott because they were successful Whigs was at best in-
judicious--yet he was far from the war-mongering monster many have 
made him out to be. 
Thomas Hart Benton, called by one of his biographers "the 
Magnificent Missourian" and by his contemporaries "Old Bullion Benton," 
was born at Hillsboro, Virginia, on March 14, 1782. Educated in North 
Carolina, he also attended the University of that state as had Polk. 
Afterward he moved to Tennessee where he served as a state senator 
2As the war with Mexico progressed it became increasingly obvious 
that the United States would win handily. The armies of Generals 
Taylor and Scott were driving into the heart of Mexico. Many in the 
United States wanted to conquer and occu:ror the whole of Mexico, and 
after dictating the peace, annex all of Mexico to the United States. 
However, the end of the war came before this movement gained enough 
momentum to achieve this end and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 
settled the issue. 
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in 1809 and was admitted to the bar in 1811. He participated in the 
War of 1812, and, following that conflict, moved in 1815 to St. Louis. 
There he became the editor of the Missouri Enguirer. In 1820 Benton 
was elected to the United States Senate, and the next year married 
Elizabeth McDowell of Virginia. A hard money man, he helped lead the 
fight against the Second National Bank during Jackson's administration. 
Benton lost his seat in the Senate in the election of 1850, largely 
because he had opposed the Compromise. He ran for the House and was 
elected, but lost this seat in the next election. Then in 1856 he 
ran for governor and was defeated. He died in 1858 of cancer.3 
To say that Benton was colorful would be too mild. His career 
in the Senate was a long one. And there he gained such power as to 
be the West's most outspoken Senator. Benton did not always reflect 
his state's viewpoints as is indicated by the fact that he was turned 
out of office because of his stand on the Compromise of 1850. He did 
have his principles, although he was a slaveholder and a Southerner 
by birth. However, he did not always follow the South in its fight 
to extend slavery. On the question of the annexation of Texas, Benton 
was much less enthusiastic than other Southerners. He feared war with 
Mexico, did not see a threat of British intervention in the affairs 
of Texas as did Calhoun, and felt that the boundaries Texas claimed 
were unrealistic. He favored negotiation with Mexico before ..American 
annexation and a reduction of Texas' boundaries, leaving the Rio Grande 
valley in Mexican hands. Howeverj he reluctantly voted for the joint 
3For additional biographical information see Elbert B. Smith~ 
Magnificent Missourian: the ~ of Thomas Hart Benton (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 195?). 
resolution of annexation, prophetically fearing what might occur as a 
result. 
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Benton's reluctance extended from the annexation of Texas to the 
declaration of war with Mexico. He believed the area in which the 
attack was made on Taylor's troops was disputed ground and he Wished 
more time to consider the possibility of an existence of war. However, 
he firmly believed that no time should be wasted in showing suppert for 
Taylor's troops and voted for the declaration, but with reservations. 
Reluctance did not characterize Benton's stand on the Wilmot 
Proviso, however. He stood resolutely against it. He had always 
been concerned with sectional harmony, and this accounts in part for 
his stand on Texas. The addition of large amounts of territory only 
brought up the problem of how it should be dispensed--slave or freer 
This position was further revealed by his vote on the Treaty of Guada;;. 
lupe-Hidalgo. Benton opposed the treaty for the same reason he had 
opposed Texas' liberal boundaries--the sectional fight to resolve the 
issue would be intense. 
Benton was not opposed to compromise, he was a unionist and 
wanted to see the Nation saved. However, he did O])}*)Se Clay's 
compromise in its original omnibus form, largely because he believed 
that the admission of California should not be tied to the other 
matters contained in the Compromise. After the Compromise was divided 
into its separate measures, Benton supported most of them. He voted 
for the New Mexico bill, the admission of California, and surprisingly 
(since nearly every Southerner opposed it as did most Missourians) 
the bill to forbid the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Not 
surprisingly, he opposed the Texas boundary bill, believing that 
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Texas had no real claim to the land it was receiving compens~tion 
' 
for losing. 
Throughout his career in politics Benton stood for what he be-
lieved. He was a politician of' the old school, loving the Union more 
than his section. Yet he was quick to speak and vote for the interests 
of Missouri and of the West in general. Benton was a :pewerful figure 
in the Senate. His influence on th~ votes of others, especially those 
from his own section, was undeniable. His views on the annexation of 
Texas, the ·war with Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850~ while not 
necessarily triumphant, were of importance and revealed in part the 
complexities which characterized the issues. 
Lewis Cass of' Michigan, another figure of importance, had been 
born in New England on October 9, 1782. He attended the academy at 
Exeter and later, after graduation, taught school in Wilmington, 
Delaware. He moved to Ohio where he set up law practice in 1802, and 
at age twenty-four he was elected to the Ohio legislature. He served 
in the army during the War of 1812 as a colonel. Following the war 
he moved to Detroit, Michigan, in 1818. His first major appointment 
was in the War Department during the administration of Jackson. Then 
in 1845, he was elected to the Senate from Michigan. His rise to 
power in the Democratic Party was rapid. He received the Dein0cratic 
nomination for the Presidency in 1848 and resigned his seat in the 
Senate to rune After his defeat, he returned to the Senate. Laterj 
between 1857 and 1860, he would serve as President James Buchanan's 
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secretary of state. He died on June 17, 1866.4 
Cass was always the nationalist. He gave full support to the War 
of 1812 and backed Polk completely on the prosecution of the Mexican 
War. In fact, Cass could have been termed an imperialist. However~ 
he abhored sectional disunity and violently opposed the Wilmot Proviso; 
thus he wholeheartedly favored Clay's compromise measures, including 
the controversial Fugitive Slave billo In short, he believed in the 
Union and desired to see it remain one, even at the cost of some of 
the anti-slavery principles which various of his Northwestern and 
Northern colleagues espoused. 
The South's greatest spokesman in the decades preceding the 
Compromise of 1850 was John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. He was born 
on March 18, 1782, and was educated in South Carolina and in Connecti-
cut at Yale University. After graduating from Yale, he st'Udied law 
at the Tapping Reeve's school in Litchfield. He then returned to 
Charleston where he was admitted to the bar in 1807. He was elected 
to the national House of Representatives in 1810 where he gained 
prominence as a "war hawk," urging war with Great Britain. He was 
appointed secretary of war by President James Monroe. Then in 1824 
Calhoun was elected vice-president and served in that capacity under 
Presidents John Quincey Adams and Andrew Jackson. It was during 
Jackson's administration that he became involved with the nullification 
dispute in which he opposed Jackson. He was appointed secretary of 
state in John Tyler's cabinet following the death of Abel Upshur and 
4For additional biographical information see Frank B. Woodford, 
Lewis~' the Last Jeffersonian (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1950). • 
in this capacity he labored for the annexation of Texas. When Polk 
took office, he did not desire the services of Calhoun and terminated 
his cabinet post. Calhoun thereupon entered the Senate where he 
remained in office until his death on March 31, 1850.5 
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John C. Calhoun was one of the more enigmatic figures in American 
history. He certainly was a brilliant theoretician, and he was a :per-
suasive speaker. Calhoun loved the nation, yet he loved his region 
more and constantly was striving to guard against his section's erosion 
of political power and influence. He defended slavery as a positive 
good and villified Northern abolitionists. Calhoun would save the 
l ~ 
Union only if the South enjoyed a protected position--and only if the 
"peculiar institution" could be made safe against the onslaughts of 
anti-slavery crusaders. And he--favored the annexation of Texas, hoping 
that it would add to the political strength of an increasingly out-
numbered South. However, he opposed the Mexican War 9 fearing the 
addition of territory which did not share the South's culture, and 
which if added to the Union might further dilute the South's position 
in national politics. Gerald White Johnson in his analysis of Calhoun 
noted that "technological advances, with the economi~ changes they 
enforced, were coercing the North to oppose slavery, independently of 
the crusade of the moralists; but this truth Calhoun never envisaged." 6 
Simply stated, Calhoun was fighting for a dying system. Tragically, 
he represented a large body of Southerners who also had failed to 
5For additional biographical information see Margaret Coit 9 
John .Q.. Calhoun, American Portrait (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 
1950). 
6Gerald White Johnson, American's Silver Age (New York: Harpar 
& Brothers Publishers, 1939), p. 239. 
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understand these changes. 
By the 1850's Massachusetts had become noted for its statesmen and 
' ' 
politicians. One of the more notable of these was Daniel Webster. 
Born on January 18, 1782, in Salisbury, New Hampshire, he suffered peor 
health as a child. Nonetheless, he entered Phillips Ex:eter AcadeI!Jjy' 
at age fourteen. After graduation, he returned to Salisbury to study' 
law and in 1805 was admitted to the Boston bar. Two years later he 
moved te Portsmouth, Massachusetts. Webster married Grace Fletcher of 
New Hampshire on May 29, 1808; afterward, he practiced law successfully 
in Portsmouth and gradually gained political influence in his state. 
He became well known after the publishing of his pamphlet Considerations 
of the Embai,go Act in 1808 in Which he def ended the rights ef New 
; 
England's commercial interests ·against Thomas Jefferson's Embargo Act. 
. ! . 
He was elected to Congress in 18i2. 
He gained national preminence When in 1819 he successfully 
pleaded.the case of Dartmouth College. In 1827, Webster was elected 
to the United States Senate. His first wife died in January of 1828, 
and he remarried in December, 1829, te Caroline Le Roy of New York. 
He was made secretary of state under William Henry Harrison arni served 
for both him and President Tyler. However, he resigned from the 
Tyler cabinet in 1843 and returned to the Senate in 1845. He later 
returned briefly to the State Department as secretary of state under 
President Millard Filmore, arrl died en October 24 9 1852. 7 
Daniel Webster was very much the sectionalist-ahe always leoked 
?For additional biographical information see Charles M. Fuess 9 
Daniel Webster (2 vols.; Boston: Little, Brown, and Comparzy, 1930)0 
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after the interests of New England. And he hated slavery, continually 
striving to limit it. However, Webster was also a nationalist; like 
Benton, Clay, Cass and others, he loved the Union and was willing to 
compromise to guarantee the continuance of the Republic. He opposed 
the annexation of Texas and the resultant spread of slavery; he favored 
a limited Mexican War. Yet in 1850 Webster was totally in favor of 
compromise. His Seventh of March speech revealed that Webster coh-
sidered the Union more important than clinging to principle when such 
action was unnecessary--nature would limit slavery~ As a spokesman 
for New England, Webster gave the nation some of its finest oratory, 
I 
and more importantly, the calm reasoning required for the Union's 
stability. 
Not all Northern congressmen were as moderate as Daniel Webster. 
There was a new, younger breed which began to make its presence felt 
during the decade of the Mexican War. Seme of these men found compro-
mise less pleasing than confrontation in forwarding their cause. One 
such man was David Wilmot. He was born on January 20, 1814, in 
Pennsylvania, and there he was educated. In 1832, he entered a law 
office in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania, and married Anne.Morgan.of 
Bethlehem feur years later. He_ was elected to the House of Representa~ 
tives in 1845 and served until 1851. In that year he ·was elected 
presiding judge of the 13th Pennsylvania district and served in that 
capacity until 1861. He helped to establish the Republican Party 
in Penpsylvania and was their first candidate for governor. President 
Abraham Lincoln offered Wilmot a position in his cabinet, but he 
refused. Instead he filled the vacated seat of the Senat0r from 
Pennsylvania who did accept a position in Lincoln's cabinet, and served 
in the Senate from 1861 to 1863. .After he left the Senate, Lincoln 
appointed him a justice on the Court of Claims, but his declining 
health precluded effective service. He died on March 16, 1868.8 
As political careers go, Wilmot's was less than distinguished. 
It was rather short, but it was quite eventful. David Wilmot was a 
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man of the moment. He represented a small but growing viewpoint in the 
North--that slavery must not be allowed to spread under any circum-
stances, and, in fact, should be abolished in the entire of the United 
States. At a time of great sectional strain, his Proviso calling for 
the prohibition of slavery in the territory gained as a result of the 
Mexican War was additional fuel for the already raging sectional fire. 
Another such radical was William Seward of New York. Born on 
May 16, 1801, he was educated in New York and graduated from Union 
College at age fifteen. He was admitted to the state bar in·l822, 
moving up to the· state senate in '1830. However, he served only one 
term, ·for he was defeated for reelectfon in 1833. He also was defeated 
for governor in 1834 when he ran on the Ant:L-Mason ticket, but was 
elected to the governorship in 1838 and 1840. Seward was elected to 
the United States Senate in 1848 on the tide of a strong anti-slavery 
sentiment in New York. With the organization of the Republican Party, 
Seward became one of its most articulate spokesmen. Later, he served 
as secretary of state under Lincoln atrl Andrew Johnson, a p:>sition he 
filled creditably. He retired to his home in Auburn, New York, in 
1871 following a trip around the world. He died on October 10, 1872. 9 
8For additional bio~raphical information see Charles B. Going, Da-
~ Wilmot, Free Soiler (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1924). 
9For additional biographical information see Glyndon Van Deusen, 
William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
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Seward's career in politics was much m.ore distinguished than that 
of Wilmot, for he became one of the abolitionists most articulate 
proponents. He was a man who stood on principle. He would oppose 
Clay's compromises because they left unchanged the moral wrongs of 
slavery. However, his position mellowed somewhat under the tutelage 
of President Lincoln.· And in the end, he supported Lincoln's plan for 
reconstruction with mercy for the South, a fact which cost him his 
popularity. 
In this morass of extremists and sectionalists~ there was one 
man who acted to hold the beleaguered nation together. That man was 
Henry Clay. He was born on April 12, 1777, in Virginia. Despite a 
scant education, he secured a positipn of clerk in the High Cau:rt 
of Chancery in 1792, and remained there for four years. Then in 1796 
he began studying law in Richmond before moving to Lexington, Kentucky, 
the following year to establish a practice. In Kentucky Clay became 
famous for his skill as a lawyer. Cley was elected to the national 
Senate in 1806 but served only briefly; then in 1807he was elected 
to the Kentucky House of Representatives where he became the speaker. 
And in 1810 he again was elected to national office, this time the 
House. He quickly earned recognition as the spokesman for the West 
and as a hawk favoring war with England. He took part in the nego~ 
tiations at Ghent following the war with Great Britain. When he 
returned, he was made speaker of the House of Representatives. He 
became an ardent champion of internal improvements, the second 
national bank, and a high protective tariff~=the .American system as 
it was called. 
In 1820, Clay saved the nation from greater turmoil by offering 
his Missouri Compromise, by which the question of slavery in the 
Louisiana Territory was settled. An unsucces~ful candidate for the 
presidency in 1824,' he served as John Quincey Adams• secretary of 
· state, was sent to the Senate in 1831, and ran unsuccessfully against 
Jackson in the presidential election of 1832. Clay remaina·d in the 
Senate until 1842 when he retired. H0wever, he left retirment in 
1844 to run on the Whig ticket for president against James K~ Polk, · 
· again to lose. Finally, he returned to the Senate in 1849, .there te 
push for the acceptance of his Compromise ef 1850. Soen afterward, 
ill-health caused him' to leave the Senate, and he died on June 29, 
1852.10 
Clay was an unusual man in that he was rarely neutral--he had 
supporter~, and he had enemies. There was ene principle which guided 
Clay's political career, his dedicatien to the Union. This dedication 
quite possibly cost him.the presidency, for it led him frequently to 
take positions which were unpopular with ene or another section ef 
the country. Carl Shurz, one ef Clay's most reknowned biographers, in 
analyzing Clay's stand on the ar:inexatien of Texas remarked that "Clay, 
in a large sense a Southern man with Northern principles, disliked 
annexation because his instinct told him that it meant the propagation 
of slavery, and. that endangered the Union.1111 His po.sitien e.n Texas 
cost him the election with Polk. Yet, despite his personal disappoint-
ments, his service to the nation was neteworthy. His ability to came 
1°For a.cil.ditional biographical information see Glyndon Van Deusen, 
11!2. Li:fe of Henry Clay (Boston: Little, Brawn, and Company, 1937)d 
11carl Shurz, Life of Henry ~ (2 vols.; Bosten: Houghton, 
Mifflin & Co., 1915);-II, 244. 
to the fore with compromises when most needed earned for him the 
title of "the Great Compromiser." 'l'he nation would miss his services 
during the decade of the 1850's. 
These then Were the men who guided the destiny of the nation in 
the stresses of the period 1845-1850. Some represented the forces of 
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union, others the forces of diVision. They belonged to tr0ubled times. 
It was during these times that the Me:xican War came into being and 
passed into history. Seemingly it was a simple war. The United States 
accomplished all its goals and more. As wars go, . it was ~i!t:helf'' a:; large 
conflict not a lengthy one. Yet this war held for the nation anguish 
beyond the usual grief which accompanies death and destruction. Weary 
with . sectional battling over the qu~·stion of slavery and freedom, the 
country was faced once again witb·haVing to 'resolve the issue of 
slavery in the newly acquired territories. The solution to the problem 
did not come easily or quickly. 
The Mexican War has been Viewed from nearly every angle. Rarely 
has it been praised, and it often has been misunderstood. Many persons 
have confused the results of the war--increased sectional tension--
with the causes of the war. Consequently, the South has been charged 
with instigating the war. Many point to the annexation of Texas as a 
cause for the war, and justly so, saying that the South wanted Texas 
in' the Union as a slave state. The rest ·of the syllogism prop0sed· that 
since the South worked diligently to gain Texas' admission' the fruit 
of the effort, the war with Mexico, should also be laid at the feet 
' 
of the South. True, many in the South did want Texas added to the 
Union, but so did many Northern&rs. In fact, as the roll-call vote 
on the joint resolution showed, the v0te was primarily a party rather 
than a sectional vote-..fuany Southern Whigs opp¢sed the measure. 
There are other facts which tend to explode the nwth that the war 
was Southern inspired. Calhoun, Berrien, and other Southern followers 
opposed the war, while many Northern congressmen and countless private 
citizens in that section urged vigorous prosecution: of the conflict. 
It can be said with some certainty that the South supported the war 
effort with more enthusiasm than the North. However, the South has 
always been more militant and military, especially in ante bellum days. 
Further, opposition to the war quickly assumed partisan character-
istics. And the section of the country most opposed to the war was 
New England, the traditional Whig stronghold. The South, on the other 
hand, was overwhelmingly Democratic. Finally, the North accepted, in 
large part, the treaty which ended the war, while some Southerners 
rejected it. If the war had been fought to add potential slave 
territory to the Union, why then the Northern support to such a move 
and why was there any Southern opposition? 
As with m6.st events in history, the Mexican War ~efies division 
into black and white, ~ight and Wrong, heroes and villains. It began 
on a nationalistic note and ended on a sectional one, mirroring the 
complexities of its age. Partisan politics and sectional strife com-
bined to fragment Congress and the nation as a wholeo The war served 
as the vehicle to party power and as an unfortunate contributor to 
sectional unease. The question of slavery in the territories gained 
as a result of war with Mexico greatly strained the nation and sowed 
the seeds of disunion. It made.the Compromise of 1850 necessary, a 
compromise which only tenuously held the nation together. The decade 
which it had helped to usher in would, in the final.analysis, prove 
to be more than the Union could bear. 
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Texas (admitted December 29, 1845) 
California (admitted September 9, 1850) 
72 
APPENDIX·B 
The following is a breakdown of the political composition of the 
Cengres·ses in the ·period 1845 ·to 1850. This composition was obtained 
by using Thomas Alexander's Sectional Stress and Party Stain (Nashville, 
1967), Joel Silbey' s ~ Shrine Qf Party (Pittsburg, 1967), the 
Biographical Directory of ~ American Congress, and the Congressienal 
Globe. Figul'es for 'the House of Representatives are based on the total 
Representatives who served including resignations and their respective 
re·placements -(does not include those Representatives who never teak 
their·seats). For·the Senate, the figures are compiled en the basis 
of two Sena.tars from each state ·(does net include Sen:aters filling 













































HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Democrat Whig Native .American 
Northeast 10 19 
Middle Atlantic 37 28 3 
Northwest 29 12 
Border 21 13 
South _jl 11 -(total) 150 84 3 
SENATE 
Democrat Whig 
Northeast 9 9 
Middle Atlantic 5 4 
Northwest 6 2 
Border 3 5 
South 18 6 




Northeast 4 8 
Middle Atlantic 4 4 
Northwest 11 1 
Border 3 5 
South 16 4 
(total) 38 23 
THIRTY .. FIRST CONGRESS 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Democrat Whig Free Soil 
Northeast 12 17 4 
Middle Atlantic 13 51 3 
Northwest 34 9 6 
Border 20 12 
South 46 16 
(total) 125 105 13 
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SENATE 
Democrat Whig Free Soil 
Northeast 3 8 1 
Middle Atlantic 2 6 
Northwest 10 1 1 
Border ·4 4 
South ...12 24 (total) 34 2 
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